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ESSAY
Two Examples of “Quasi-ConstitutionalAmendments” From the ItalianConstitutional Evolution—A Response toRichard Albert
NICOLA LUPO†
In response to Richard Albert’s Quasi-Constitutional Amendments,65 BUFF. L. REV. 739 (2017).
INTRODUCTION
Richard Albert’s theoretical proposal in his article is atthe same time innovative and challenging, especially when itaims to define a new category of constitutional phenomena:“quasi-constitutional amendments.”1 He defines these quasi-constitutional amendments as “sub-constitutionalalteration[s] to the operation of a set of existing norms in theconstitution.”2 Albert analyzes this phenomenon in contextof the jurisdiction of Canada, and shows how it derives fromthe difficulty of formal constitutional amendment there.3 Hedraws a couple of rather recent examples from thatjurisdiction: the Regional Veto Law and the new process forSenate appointment.4 Both show the ability to successfullyachieve constitutional change through non-constitutionalmeans.
† Full Professor of Public Law, LUISS University, Rome, Italy.
1. Richard Albert, Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 739,740. (2017).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 739.
4. See id. at 745, 748.
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 5. See id. at 743. 
 6. Id.
 7. Id. 
 at 744. 
 at 744–45. 
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Moving beyond the Canadian experience, Albertmaintains that the category of quasi-constitutionalamendments is potentially transferrable to any legal order,with or without a written constitution, and providesexamples from the United States and Australia,5 as well asthe parallel concept of “constitutional statutes” in the UnitedKingdom.6 According to Albert, moreover, the category seemsto be growing, and looks especially well-suited for matters ofconstitutional structure, where it is more difficult to changethe meaning of the constitution through judicialinterpretation.7 
In this contribution, I will respond with some referencesto the concrete experience of the Italian legal order indifferent phases of its historical evolution with a flexible aswell as rigid constitution. I will quote a couple of examplesand an academic debate on similar concepts. The aim is todemonstrate the qualities of Albert’s new category while, atthe same time, showing that the phenomena to which itrefers are far from recent. Additionally, I seek todemonstrate that Albert’s new category raises, by definition,a number of controversies that Albert himself acknowledges.
Specifically, I will address two examples of quasi-constitutional amendments. The first occurred at the time ofthe Albertine Statute—which was conceded in 1848 by KingCharles Albert of Savoy and considered a flexibleconstitution—and concerned the form of government. Theletter of the Albertine Statute stated in article five that theexecutive power was vested in the king alone—laying out aconstitutional monarchy with a division-of-powers system.Rather soon after its entry into force, however, the influenceof the elected Chamber of Deputies and the autonomy of thePrime Minister transformed the form of government, which,mainly due to the influence of parliamentary rules and
      
                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                         
 
 8. FRANCO PIERANDREI, La Corte Costituzionale e le ‘Modificazioni Tacite’ della C ioostituz ne, in 4 SCRITTI GIURIDICI IN ONORE DI A. SCIALOJA, 315 (1953). 
 9. Id.   at
tan
742. 
 10.  Cos tino Mortati, La Costituzione in Senso Materiale (1998). 
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practices, gradually evolved towards a quasi-parliamentaryand then a parliamentary system. The second occurredduring the era of the Constitution of the Italian Republic— which took effect in 1948 as a rigid constitution assisted by acentralized system of judicial review of legislation—andconcerned ratification and execution of the internationaltreaties of the newly founded European Community andtheir subsequent reforms. The constitution, as in all theother Member States of the European Union, prevailed overnational—even constitutional—norms and deeplytransformed the Italian Constitution. In Italy, thisratification—given the impossibility of reaching the highparliamentary majority required for a proper constitutionalamendment—did not happen through any constitutionalamendment. Rather, it took place through ordinary statutesand reliance on a general clause embedded in article elevenof the Italian Constitution which addressed the openness tothe international order and the consequent limitations ofsovereignty.
A relevant academic debate among Italian constitutionallaw scholars on forms of quasi-constitutional amendmentshad already emerged in the 1950s, although in a slightlydifferent category, defined more generally—especially byPierandrei and Tosi—as “tacit constitutional modifications.”8This debate focused precisely on the main risks of thecategory that Albert defines: creating “a mismatch betweenconstitutional design and political practice” and, ultimately,undermining “the constitution itself and the very purpose ofcodification.”9 These risks are why Albert’s category, as wellas the similar notion of “constitution in a material sense”10— very commonly used in the Italian academic and politicaldebate—should be handled with extreme care and caution,
      
     
                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                           
 
                               
 
            
           
          
1042 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
especially by constitutional law scholars.
I. FIRST EXAMPLE: THE PARLIAMENTARIZATION OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT PROVIDED BY THE ALBERTINE STATUTE 
The first reported example of quasi-constitutionalamendment occurred with regards to the Albertine Statuteof 1848’s reference to the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont,which lasted for almost a century—though interrupted by afascist regime—prior to the current Italian Constitution. TheAlbertine Statute was the only one among the other chartersenacted in the Italian peninsula in 1848–49 to survive therepression that came to pass in all the other States since1849. It permitted the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont tobecome leader of the “Risorgimento.” In 1861, the unificationprocess, led by the King of Savoy (Victor Emmanuel II,Charles Albert’s first son) and his Prime Minister (CamilloBenso, Count of Cavour), was solidified and the AlbertineStatute became the fundamental charter of the Kingdom ofItaly.
This document was not given the name of “Constitution”because that term evoked the French Revolution and itsattendant traumatic events such as the constituentassemblies that were being convened in Paris in those verymonths. “‘[S]tatute’ was a more neutral term, which recalledthe Italian municipal tradition.”11 However, independentlyfrom its name, in all respects the Albertine Statute was aclassic example of a constitution of a liberal modern State. Itwas formally “conceded” on March 4, 1848 by the king “withregal loyalty and fatherly love.”12 Thus, Italian scholarship
11. Sabino Cassese, The Italian Constitutional Architecture: from Unificationto the Present Day, Paper delivered at the International Conference on TheUnification of Italy and American Independence (Sept. 20, 2011),http://www.irpa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Italian-Constitutional-Architecture.pdf.
12. Statuto Albertino (It.), translated in S.M. LINDSAY & L.S. ROWE,CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, TRANSLATED AND SUPPLIED WITH ANINTRODUCTION AND NOTES 272 (1984) (quoted text translated from Italian).
      
                          
                                                                          
                                                      
                                                                                    
 
 13. See PAOLO COLOMBO, CON LEALTÀ DI RE E CON AFFETTO DI PADRE: O,4  TORIN   MARZO 1848: LA CONCESSIONE DELLO STATUTO ALBERTINO (2003) 49. 
 14. Statuto Albertino (It.), translated in S.M. L K I , T  L.S.C INDSAY &  ROWE, ONSTITUTION OF THE INGDOM OF TALY  RANSLATED AND SUPPLIED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 274 (1984). 
 15. e S e ALESSANDRO PACE, L A CAUSA DELLA RIGIDITÀ COSTITUZIONALE: UNA R BILETTURA DI RYCE, DELLO STATUTO ALBERTINO E DI QUALCHE    ALTRACOSTITUZIONE (1996).
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usually speaks of a “charte octroyée” as opposed to thoseconstitutions that are approved by the people by way ofpopular vote, constituent assembly, or convention.13 
The Albertine Statute declared itself “perpetual andirrevocable.”14 However, as it did not provide for any specialprocedure for its revision, it was soon deemed to be a“flexible” constitution—that is, not hierarchically superior toordinary legislation—although it probably was originallyconceived as an unamendable or petrified constitution.15 Inany case, throughout its rather long history the AlbertineStatute has never been amended, although many of itsprovisions were indeed waived or implicitly repealed.
One of the most relevant cases of implicit constitutionalchange involves the rules on a key feature of thisconstitution: the form of government—i.e., the rulesregarding the distribution of power—or, more precisely, theallocation of the power of “general political direction” (the so-called “indirizzo politico”) among constitutional bodies orbranches of the government.
Similar to many constitutions conceded in continentalEurope at the beginning of the nineteenth century, theAlbertine Statute elaborated a constitutional monarchywhich designed, in general terms, a so-called pureconstitutional system. This means that the form ofgovernment was a “division of power system,” in which theexecutive depended exclusively on the king, who derived hislegitimacy from God. In this system, the legislative powerwas vested in the Parliament, with a house appointed by theking—i.e., the Government—and another elected by a
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limited popular suffrage. Indeed, according to article five ofthe Albertine Statute, the executive power was vested in theKing alone.16 
Nevertheless, the form of government very soon evolvedtowards a parliamentary one, usually defined as one inwhich the executive is responsible to the legislature througha confidence relationship. To be more precise, the executivesduring the Albertine Statute were still appointed by the king,but they needed also, and probably first and foremost, theconfidence of the elected Chamber of Deputies.17 Similar towhat had happened a couple of centuries earlier in theevolution of the British form of government, the king stoppedpresiding over the executive’s meetings, thus granting aspecial role to the emerging figure of the Prime Minister andat the same time opening the space for deriving theexecutive’s legitimacy also, and then exclusively, from theelected Parliament.
Therefore, the influence of the elected Chamber ofDeputies and the autonomy of the Prime Minister changedthe form of government, which gradually evolved towardsparliamentarism, or, as some authors classified it, pseudo-parliamentarism.18 The direction of this evolution and the defacto replacement of the norm elaborated by the AlbertineStatute is undisputed. More debated is the moment at whichthe system should be qualified as parliamentary.19 Alsodebated is the question whether this form of governmentcould be classified as fully parliamentary at least at the end
16. Art. 5 Statuto Albertino (It.), translated in S.M. LINDSAY & L.S. ROWE,CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, TRANSLATED AND SUPPLIED WITH ANINTRODUCTION AND NOTES 276 (1984).
17. See CARLO GHISALBERTI, STORIA COSTITUZIONALE D’ITALIA (1848–1994) 49(2d ed. 2002); Vittorio Di Ciolo, Modificazioni “tacite” dello Statuto Albertino(1848–1943) XXIII Rivista di Studi Politici 93–132 (2011); GIORGIO REBUFFA, LOSTATUTO ALBERTINO 83 (2003).
18. The reference is to GIUSEPPE MARANINI, STORIA DEL POTERE IN ITALIA(1848–1967), AT 25 FF. (1st ed 1967) (seeing it as a synonym for assemblearism).
19. For a synthesis of the debate, see CARLO GHISALBERTI, supra note 17, at49; Vittorio Di Ciolo, supra note 17, at 93–132; REBUFFA, supra note 17.
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of its evolution, that is, at the beginning of the twentiethcentury. Those who oppose this reading and prefer to talk ofa pseudo-parliamentary regime remark that both the entryinto World War I and, even more clearly, Mussolini’s rise topower, took place in ways that were more consistent with aseparation-of-powers system than with a parliamentary formof government, that is, by relying on the will of the King morethan on that of the parliamentary majority.
One last element needs to be examined, regarding thesources of law through which this evolution took place. Themost important are parliamentary rules and practices,especially those non-written procedures through which theChamber of Deputies should vote in favor of the initialconfidence in Government.20 Also relevant are some pieces oflegislation, approved at the turn of the century, regardingthe role of the President of the Council—especially royaldecree n. 466/1901, the so-called “Zanardelli decree.”21 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCEDURE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ITALIAN R  EPUBLIC
To better understand the second example, drawn fromthe experience of the Italian Republic started in 1946, it isnecessary to quickly recall the main feature of itsconstitutional amendment procedure. In fact, the origins ofthe Italian Republic and the need to avoid a repetition of thefascist experience help to explain Italian Constitution’srigidity, assisted by a centralized system of judicial review oflegislation—similar to other constitutions approved in the
20. FABRIZIO ROSSI, SAGGIO SUL SISTEMA POLITICO DELL’ITALIA LIBERALE:PROCEDURE FIDUCIARIE E SISTEMA DEI PARTITI FRA OTTO E NOVECENTO (2001);ROMANO FERRARI ZUMBINI, La Torino del 1848–49 come LaboratorioCostituzionale: La Nascita Spontanea della Fiducia Parlamentare, in LE CARTE E
LA STORIA, 2, 75–85 (2016).
21. PIETRO BARRERA, The First Institutional Reform: New Discipline inGovernment Activity, in 4 ITALIAN POLITICS 20 (remarking how till the approvalof law no. 400/1988 this has been the only normative act devoted to regulatingthe powers of the President of the Council).
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same years, for example in Germany.22 In the same way, theprocedure for constitutional amendment, as provided byArticle 138,23 mirrors the main features of the ItalianConstitution’s approval process.24 Two elements of theconstitutional amendment procedure recall the making ofthe Italian Constitution. The constitution was approved by ahigh majority of the Constituent Assembly in December 1947without need for any further constitutional referendumfollowing that of June 1946 on the choice between a republicand a monarchy; this took place simultaneously to theelections of the same Constituent Assembly.25 
First, the main and fundamental requirement forwriting as well as for amending the constitution is a wideconsensus within Parliament among the political parties.The procedure for amending the constitution requires twiceas much approval from each parliamentary House as thatrequired for passing ordinary statutes.26 This means thateach House must vote twice on the very same bill to revisethe constitution. Whereas the first approval follows theordinary rules, the second prohibits any further modificationto the bill and requires higher majorities. As long as aconstitutional amendment receives a favorable vote in thesecond deliberation—two-thirds of the members of each ofthe two Houses—held at least three months after the first
22. VÌCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATICVALUES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 4, 6–8 (2009); MAARTJE DE VISSER,CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2015); VITTORIABARSOTTI, PAOLO G. CAROZZA, MARTA CARTABIA & ANDREA SIMONCINI, ITALIANCONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 11–35, 88, 217 (2016).
23. Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It) translated in BARSOTTI ET AL., supra note22, at 270.
24. See TANIA GROPPI, FEDERALISMO E COSTITUZIONE: LA REVISIONECOSTITUZIONALE NEGLI STATI FEDERALI 26 (2001) (indicating that this is rathernormal).
25. John Clarke Adams & Paolo Barile, The Implementation of the ItalianConstitution, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 61, 61 (1953).
26. Art. 64, 72, 138, Costituzione [Cost.] (It) translated in BARSOTTI ET AL.,supra note 22, at 254, 255, 270.
      
                      
                                                                                                                                                                                      
                                           
 
                 
   
   
   
   
             
2017] TWO EXAMPLES FROM ITALY 1047
after the two houses have agreed on the same text, theamendment is promulgated and enters into force withoutany other requirement.27 
Second, the possibility of a referendum is envisaged, butonly in the case where a wide parliamentary consensus is notachieved. The constitutional referendum occurs uponrequest, and only when a simple majority, but not two-thirdsof both houses is attained.28 So, in any case, theconstitutional amendment must be approved by a higherstandard that the simple majority of both houses required forthe approval of ordinary legislation. A referendum can berequested within three months following the completion ofthe parliamentary process by parliamentary minorities (atleast one-fifth of the members of each house), the citizens(500,000 voters), or the Regions (five Regional Councils).29 Ifcorrectly requested, the constitutional referendum must takeplace within the subsequent three months.30 Theconstitutional referendum, either accepting or rejecting theamendment, is valid irrespective of the percentage of thevoters that go to the polls.31 The same rule applied for theaforementioned referendum of 1946. In part because it tookplace concurrently with the first democratic elections afterthe fascist regime, that referendum obtained a very highturnout of eighty-nine percent of the electorate.
The necessity and sufficiency of a wide parliamentaryconsensus were even clearer between 1948 and 1970, that is,before the legislation required to implement all the kinds ofreferendums provided by the constitution was enacted.32 This means that all the constitutional amendments before





32. Legge 25 maggio 1970 n.352, G.U. June 15, 1970, n.147 (It.).
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1970 needed to attain a two-thirds vote in both Houses in thesecond vote because the other way—absolute majorityfollowed by a requested constitutional referendum—was notavailable.
The aforementioned procedures have not impeded acertain number of constitutional amendments, aimed atrevising some specific provisions of the Constitution. Bythese procedures, sixteen constitutional amendments havebeen approved since 1948. The procedures have amendedtwenty-nine articles (some of them more than once) andsuppressed four articles (all of them included in the FifthTitle of the Second Part, on territorial autonomies), while nobrand-new article has been added into the text of theconstitution.
At the same time, through these procedures the approvalof a constitutional amendment aimed at more systematicallyrevising some elements of the constitutional structure hasbeen substantially impossible. The supermajority requiredfor the parliamentary approval of the amendmentstrengthens the veto power.33 Additionally, the outcome ofthe constitutional referendum is a further unknown.Constitutional referendums have been held on threeoccasions: in 2001 with the approval of a constitutionalrevision on territorial autonomies proposed by a center-leftmajority, in 2006 with the repeal of reform on the entiresecond part of the constitution proposed by the BerlusconiGovernment and its center-right majority, and in 2016 withthe rejection of the reform aiming at changing Parliament’sstructure proposed by the Renzi Government.34 
33. Cf. Carlo Fusaro, Italy, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE. A COMPARATIVESTUDY 211, 211–234 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011); Tania Groppi,Constitutional Revision in Italy: A Marginal Instrument for ConstitutionalChange, in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 203, 208 (Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013).
34. See QUIRINO CAMERLENGO, LA COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA: COMMENTOARTICOLO PER ARTICOLO (Francesco Clementi et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2018).
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III. SECOND EXAMPLE: THE RATIFICATION BY ORDINARY LEGISLATION OF THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE REU OPEAN COMMUNITY 
Consistent with Albert’s thesis, the difficulties inachieving constitutional amendments—especially due to thehigh parliamentary majority required—help explain therecourse to sub-constitutional sources of law for objectivesthat also would have required a constitutional provision.Arguably, the main changes of the Italian Constitution didnot happen through formal constitutional amendments.Deep and informal constitutional changes, inter alia, on thesources of law, economic relations, and balance betweenParliament and Government, derived indeed from Italy’smembership first in the European Community and then inthe European Union (EU).
As clearly stated by the Court of Justice of the EU, EUtreaties and EU law more generally prevail over national lawand even national constitutional norms since the 1960s.35 Itis well-known that this same principle has been accepted bymost Member States, mainly through the case law ofconstitutional courts recognizing the primacy of EU law,36 and in some cases keeping the possibility of invoking“counter-limits” where EU law infringed upon the supremeprinciples of the national legal order.37 
35. See the landmark Costa judgement (Case 6/64) of the European Court ofJustice (“the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, couldnot, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legalprovisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character ascommunity law and without the legal basis of the community itself being calledinto question.” ).
36. See ALFONSO CELOTTO & TANIA GROPPI, Diritto UE e diritto nazionale:primauté vs. controlimiti, RIV.IT.DIR.PUBBL.COM 1309 (2004).
37. The expression “counter-limits” (“controlimiti”), although widely used inscholarly debate has been used by the Italian Constitutional Court just once. SeeCass., 22 Ottobre 2014, Race. Uff. Corte Cost. 2014, CL, 1 169, 187; Paolo Barile,Il Cammino Comunitario della Corte, in GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 2406(1973) (commenting on the decision no. 183/1973). On the “controlimiti” doctrine,see MARTA CARTABIA, PRINCIPI INVIOLABILI E INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA 130–313(1995), and recently, PIETRO FARAGUNA, AI CONFINI DELLA COSTITUZIONE: PRINCIPI
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Different from what happened in many other EUMember States,38 in Italy the ratification (and the execution)of the international treaties founding the EuropeanCommunities and all their subsequent reforms from the1950s until the Treaty of Lisbon did not require anyconstitutional amendment and took place through ordinarylegislation. The effect of national legislation giving way forEU law was obtained, indeed, through constitutionalinterpretation. Both the legislature, in ratifying foundingtreaties, and the Constitutional Court, in ruling on thecompliance of EU law with constitutional principles, reliedon the general clause embedded in Article 11 of the ItalianConstitution on openness to the international order and theconsequent limitations of sovereignty.39 
The choice not to amend the constitution or to include a“European clause,” instead relying on the general clauseembedded in Article 11 was originally taken by thelegislature based on the argument that the Europeanintegration process achieved international peace and justiceamong nations.40 Essentially, it is derived from politicalreasons; the opposition of the communist and socialistparties made it practically impossible to reach thesupermajority then necessary to amend the Constitution.41 
Thus, under the wide umbrella of Article 11, Italy’s
SUPREMI E IDENTITÀ COSTITUZIONALE 72–113 (2015).
38. See Fusaro, supra note 33, at 223 (stating that “Italy is the only Europeannation with a textual Constitution which has never been amended in order toallow the ratification of any European Treaty . . .”). For a wider comparativeanalysis, see generally National Constitutional Avenues for Further EUIntegration, PARL. EUR. DOC. (PE 493.046) 263 (2014) [hereinafter EU IntegrationStudy].
39. Fusaro, supra note 33, at 225
40. SERGIO BARTOLE, INTERPRETAZIONI E TRASFORMAZIONI DELLA COSTITUZIONE
REPUBBLICANA 276 (2004).
41. AUGUSTO BARBERA, COSTITUZIONE DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA in 8ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO: ANNALI 263–358, at 352 (2015); ANTONIO VARSORI, LACENERENTOLA D’EUROPA? L’ITALIA E L’INTEGRAZIONE EUROPEA DAL 1947 AD OGGI34 (2010).
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participation in the EU has relied essentially on legislativemeans alone, starting from the authorization of theratification of the first European treaties,42 soon confirmedby the Italian Constitutional Court. Even though it tooksome time to find a way to combine the dualist approach ofthe Italian legal order with the Court of Justice’s earlyaffirmation of the primacy and direct effect,43 the ItalianConstitutional Court never called for constitutional reformin order to participate in the integration process, affirmingthe possibility of coping with it by interpreting theconstitution in force.44 
The same model was then followed for authorizing theratification of all further treaty revisions.45 A bill wassubmitted by the Government and approved as quickly andplainly as possible by a large parliamentary majority—whichenlarged even more as the parties of the left becamegradually more in favor of European integration—and noreferendum or prior check of compatibility with the ItalianConstitution was required.46 This happened again with theTreaty of Lisbon, but this was also because the ItalianParliament had been among the first to ratify theconstitutional treaty three years earlier.47 This helps toexplain why there was no negative vote cast or abstention onthe bill authorizing its ratification in the Senate (on July 23,2008) or the Chamber of Deputies (on July 31, 2008). If no
42. Legge 14 Ottobre 1957, n. 1203, G.U. Dec. 23, 1957, n.317.
43. See Barile, supra note 37. See also Federico Sorrentino, La CostituzioneItaliana di Fronte al Processo di Integrazione Europea, 13 QuaderniCostituzionali 71–112, at 73 ff. (1993); Marta Cartabia, The Italian ConstitutionalCourt and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the EuropeanUnion, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE ANDJURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT, 133–46 (Ann-MarieSlaughter et al. eds., 1998).
44. BARSOTTI ET AL., supra note 22, at 205.
45. Id. at 208.
46. Id. at 206.
47. Nicola Lupo & Giovanni Piccirilli, Conclusion to THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 317, 326 (Lupo-Piccirilli ed. 2017).
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constitutional amendment was needed to ratify theconstitutional treaty, the same held for a treaty like Lisbon,which, at least formally intended to downgrade theconstitutional impact (as well as some constitutionalrhetoric) of its immediate predecessor.
In more general terms, this example seems to confirmthat the recourse to quasi-constitutional amendments mightbe driven by the difficulty of formal amendment procedures.However, this difficulty should be measured not just in acontingent way at a certain moment in constitutionalhistory, but as a permanent feature of legal order. Otherwise,it would be hardly understandable why Italy, even withextremely high consensus on EU membership and itstransformation into a federal state,48 has never ratified aEuropean treaty through a constitutional amendment.
IV. THE ITALIAN DEBATE ON “TACIT CONSTITUTIONAL MODIFICATIONS” A   ND THE “NON-TRIVIAL RISKS” OF “QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENTS”
The two examples from the Italian constitutionalexperience above confirm that the new proposedclassification of quasi-constitutional amendments is veryuseful and clarifying.
Even the current situation—subsequent to the rejectionof the constitutional amendment aimed at reforming theItalian symmetrical bicameralism by the constitutionalreferendum held on December 4, 2016—could pave the way
48. EU Integration Study, supra note 38, at 157 (discussing an advisoryreferendum held in 1989 that showed the high level of consensus around theEuropean integration process. Through it, Italian citizens were asked —on thesame day in which they were called to elect the European Parliament—whetherthey wanted to transform the European Communities into a Union, with aGovernment responsible before the European Parliament, and to confer to theEuropean Parliament a mandate to draft a project of a European Constitution.The result confirmed the wide pro-European orientation of the Italian publicopinion at that time, as 88.1 percent of the voters gave a positive reply (with thehigh turnout of 81 percent)).
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to further quasi-constitutional amendments.49 The rejectionclearly showed the great difficulty of any constitutionalreform of the current Italian Parliament: in the finalreferendum, veto powers could easily ally with each otherand defeat any attempt of constitutional reform, especiallywhen it deals with a controversial issue such as the design ofa Senate with different powers than the lower house. Aftersuch a defeat and the unresolved debate on a constitutionalreform of the symmetrical bicameralism that has lasted sincethe 1980s, with all the main political parties recognizing theneed of a series of institutional changes, constitutionalinnovation processes must follow in ways other than theprocedures for constitutional amendments in Article 138 atleast in the short-term and probably also in the medium-term.50 
It is best to conclude by summarizing an academic debatethat developed in Italy in the 1950s to confirm not only thatthe phenomena that the category of quasi-constitutional
49. In classifying this attempted constitutional reform as a “constitutionalamendment,” I am dissenting from Albert’s view that it is a case of “constitutionaldismemberment.” See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment andDismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 3 (forthcoming 2018). For a discussion thatshares Albert’s opinion, see Lorenza Violini & Antonia Baraggia, The ItalianConstitutional Challenge: An Overview of the Upcoming Referendum, INT’L J.CONST. L. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/12/the-italian-constitutional-challenge-an-overview-of-the-upcoming-referendum. In fact, touse Albert’s definitions, it would not have altered “the identity, the fundamentalvalues or the architecture of the constitution,” but could be assessed—at leastaccording to its promoters and supporters—as “an arrangement made to betterachieve the purpose of the existing constitution.” Albert, supra. Although it wouldhave modified a high number of constitutional provisions (most of them just tocoordinate them with the reform of symmetrical bicameralism), it would have leftuntouched the whole first part of the Constitution (on the rights and duties of thecitizens) and would not have directly touched upon the relationships betweenGovernment and Parliament.
50. See generally Quaderno 2015–2016 IL FILANGIERI 1–331 (2017) (which is aspecial issue on Il Parlamento dopo il Referendum Costituzionale); GiudittaBrunelli, Lo “Spazio” dei Regolamenti Parlamentari nelle Riforme Costituzionale(2016), in OSSERVATORIO SULLE FONTI 11–12 (2017), www.osservatoriosullefonti.it(citing SILVANO TOSI, MODIFICAZIONI TACITE DELLA COSTITUZIONE 39–40, 94(1959).); Nicola Lupo, On the Failed Reform of the Italian Senate in ConstitutionalIssues and Challenges in Hungary and Italy (forthcoming).
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amendment aims at describing are indeed far from new asthey were already taking place then, but also that scholarshave already reflected somewhat on the features of thesephenomena.
In Italy the debate focused on a slightly differentcategory called “tacit constitutional modifications”(“modificazioni tacite della Costituzione”).51 The category,introduced by Pierandrei, was defined as including “acts orfacts able to in some way vary the function of constitutionalbodies, although leaving formally unaltered the norms thatrule them.”52 However, Tosi then profitably applied thiscategory to the so-called parliamentary law (theparliamentary rules and procedures already discussed), butalso sharply criticized its features.53 The main criticismfocused on the positivist argument that in a system with arigid constitution it would not be proper to speak of tacitmodification: these phenomena, he argued, are eitheroutcomes of interpretative evolution of the constitution, andtherefore legal, or else they are violations of the constitution,which are always illegal.54 
Some of these same scholars’ discussions also concernedthe possibility of applying the category to flexibleconstitutions, with obvious reference to the U.K. legal order,admitted by Pierandrei and normally excluded by Tosi.55 Tosi, however, recognized tacit modifications to a certainextent, especially in the relations between Government andParliament as they require some dynamic elements so longas they do not alter the constitution’s guarantees and the
51. FRANCO PIERANDREI, La Corte Costituzionale e le ‘Modificazioni Tacite’della Costituzione, in 4 SCRITTI GIURIDICI IN ONORE DI A. SCIALOJA, 315 (1953).
52. FRANCO PIERANDREI, La Corte Costituzionale e le ‘Modificazioni Tacite’della Costituzione, in 4 SCRITTI GIURIDICI IN ONORE DI A. SCIALOJA, 315 (1953).
53. TOSI, supra note 50, at 5
54. Id. at 5 (adding that theft, even when reiterated under the sleepyguardianship of the policemen, is something different from the repeal of theproperty right).
55. PIERANDREI, supra note 51, at 332; TOSI, supra note 50, at 12.
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equilibrium.56 
This debate, often referenced in the following decades,57 was also explicitly linked to the one regarding the use ofother concepts that similarly aimed at considering elementsof political dynamics arising outside of the constitutionaltext, such as the elasticity of the constitution,58 and, most ofall, the constitution “in a material sense” (sometimes calledthe “material constitution”).59 That category, proposed byMortati during the fascist era and then again with theconstitution (to which he significantly contributed as amember of the Constituent Assembly), has been by far themost successful, not only among legal scholars, but alsoamong historians and political scientists, and even in publicdebate, although it is extremely controversial.60 
CONCLUSION
In synthesis, the Italian academic debate on these verysimilar concepts testifies to the emergence of what canprobably be considered the two main “non-trivial risks” ofquasi-constitutional amendments. As Albert defines them:first, to create “a mismatch between constitutional designand political practice that constitutional actors can in turn
56. TOSI, supra note 50, at 38.
57. See, e.g., CLAUDIO DE CESARE, Le Modificazioni Tacite della CostituzioneNell’attuale Sistema Parlamentare Italiano, in 1 RASSEGNA PARLAMENTARE 121– 50 (2010); RENATO IBRIDO, L’INTERPRETAZIONE DEL DIRITTO PARLAMENTARE:POLITICA E DIRITTO NEL “PROCESSO” DI RISOLUZIONE DEI CASI REGOLAMENTARI 127(2015). More recently, see generally Brunelli, supra note 50.
58. Luigi Rossi, La “Elasticità” dello Statuto Italiano, in 1 SCRITTI GIURIDICIIN ONORE DI SANTI ROMANO 70 (1940). For a more recent discussion, see GIULIANOAMATO, L’ELASTICITÀ DELLE COSTITUZIONI RIGIDE, 1–2 (2016) , http://www.nomos-leattualitaneldiritto.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Amato_Nomos1-2016.pdf.
59. COSTANTINO MORTATI, LA COSTITUZIONE IN SENSO MATERIALE (1998).
60. See Gustavo Zagrebelsky, introduction to LA COSTITUZIONE IN SENSOMATERIALE supra note 59 (recalling the applause with which an assembly ofItalian constitutional law scholars in 1994, at the beginning of the Berlusconiyears, reacted to the proposal by Paladin to abandon in toto the concept of theconstitution in a material sense).
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exploit for political expedient purposes” and secondly, to“undermine[] the constitution itself and the very purpose ofcodification.”61 
These risks are why this category, as well as the similarnotion of the “material constitution,” should be handled withextreme care, especially by constitutional law scholars. It isclear that the use of similar categories risks encouragingpolitics and politicians to diminish the role and the weight ofthe constitution, or at least of the constitutional text, whichwould be in contrast with what is often seen as one of themethodological guidelines of constitutional lawscholarship62: interpreting the constitution magis ut valeat,that is, in a way that maximizes its relevance and itseffectiveness.
61. Albert, supra note 1, at 742. The first “nontrivial risk” identified by Albertseems indeed slightly less dangerous and consists of blurring “the line separatingthe constitutional from the non-constitutional.” Id. at 742.
62. VEZIO CRISAFULLI, 11 LA COSTITUZIONE E LE SUE DISPOSIZIONI DI PRINCIPIO(1952); GUSTAVO ZAGREBELSKY, 5 LA VIRTÙ DEL DUBBIO (2007).
